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NO. 15 FEBRUARY 2021 Introduction 
The Pandemic and Governance in the 
Maghreb: A Moment of Truth 
The Covid-19 Pandemic Tests the Sustainability of Different Governance Approaches 
Intissar Fakir and Isabelle Werenfels 
The global pandemic crisis has highlighted the inherent weaknesses of governance in 
countries of the Maghreb. It has underscored Morocco’s lagging human development 
and infrastructure amid growing authoritarianism. In Algeria, where the government 
is struggling with an ongoing legitimacy crisis, the pandemic has exposed the state’s 
weak public services. In Tunisia, the pandemic has emphasised the disarray of the coun-
try’s political elites and the effects of the protracted transition on state output. Yet, 
the pandemic crisis has pushed some of these governments to seize opportunities, in-
cluding speeding up digitalisation, allowing for citizen engagement, and even seeking 
some self-sufficiency in terms of medical production. As these countries pursue eco-
nomic relief and support to overcome the growing economic impacts from the crisis, 
European partners have the opportunity to use their leverage to promote policies 
that reduce inequality, prioritise investment in critical infrastructure, and encourage 
transparent and responsive citizen–government relations. 
 
In the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic 
crisis, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia fared 
well by global comparison. Swift and deci-
sive government action in Morocco and 
Tunisia allowed both countries to limit the 
initial spread of infections. Even Algeria, 
which had, by comparison, struggled to 
put in place and enforce a coherent initial 
response, did not become a hotspot. How-
ever, as the pandemic progresses and as 
waves of infections continue to hit all three 
countries, decision-makers are grappling 
with collapsing health care infrastructure, 
prolonged economic impacts, and rising 
popular anger. This confluence of factors 
presents an unprecedented test of the sus-
tainability of the governance approaches in 
each country. As public dissatisfaction – 
driven by long-standing grievances that are 
now being exacerbated by the pandemic – 
grows, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia may 
face greater instability if they do not bal-
ance short-term relief efforts with long-term 
governance reforms. 
Initial Response: Decisive Factors 
In the first few months, the initial but brief 
success in Morocco was due to a swift and 
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clear decision-making process, and in 
Tunisia it was the result of a remarkable – 
even if ephemeral – elite consensus. The 
two governments quickly pushed a clear 
strategy to contain movement, close borders, 
and limit travel, along with measures to 
alleviate some of the initial economic im-
pacts of the containment. Both govern-
ments incorporated new technology to con-
trol population movement and ensure some 
continuation of daily activities. For exam-
ple, in a highly publicised effort in Tunisia, 
robots and drones patrolled the streets. 
Tunis also sped up previously lengthy and 
tedious procedures by migrating bureau-
cratic processes, such as applying for busi-
ness permits, online. In Morocco, the gov-
ernment’s digital efforts included a health 
ministry application for sharing up-to-date 
information with medical personnel. 
The two countries also created a range 
of economic measures to lessen the initial 
impacts. In Morocco, King Mohammed VI 
announced the creation of a special emer-
gency fund in March 2020. The fund – 
which was supported by charitable dona-
tions from average to wealthy Moroccans, 
including the King – was to help vulner-
able sectors and be used to upgrade the 
national health system’s infrastructure. 
External donors, most notably Germany, 
the European Union (EU), the United States, 
Japan, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), also contributed. The govern-
ment provided stipends (ranging from $80 
to $120) to informal-sector workers without 
social security beginning in April. These 
payments were made accessible through 
codes sent to registered mobile phones. In 
Tunisia, early measures included the estab-
lishment of a national solidarity fund, 
governed by a committee of officials that 
included union and industry representa-
tives. By October the fund had collected 
more than $70 million, including from pri-
vate-sector and external donors. Further-
more, Morocco and Tunisia provided tax 
breaks and interest rate reductions to sup-
port struggling businesses, particularly in 
the tourism sector. In July 2020, Morocco 
announced a stimulus package of $12.8 bil-
lion, including $8 billion in loans. The gov-
ernment declared a comprehensive recovery 
roadmap for the private sector – including 
loans and grants for small and medium-
sized enterprises – and reforms in the pub-
lic sector to lessen its budget burden. 
Tunisia unveiled a nine-month Rescue and 
Recovery Plan in collaboration with the IMF 
in June 2020. The plan included more than 
$526 million to public projects and allocated 
$35 million for unemployment payments as 
well as $245 million to struggling businesses. 
In Algeria the state’s initial response was 
neither as clear nor as effective. The govern-
ment was slower to implement measures 
of containment and closures. Still, despite 
dwindling reserves due to shrinking oil and 
gas revenues, the government enacted relief 
measures targeting vulnerable segments 
of society and for private enterprises. How-
ever, the mechanisms of distribution were 
opaque, and many claimed the funds never 
reached them. The Algerian government 
was also relying on civil society networks, 
including support from Algerians in the 
diaspora, to provide more relief. In addition 
to these measures, in July the Algerian 
government introduced an economic plan 
to mitigate the impacts of lower revenues 
from hydrocarbons and encourage eco-
nomic diversification – including import 
restrictions – in order to improve liquidity. 
Many elements of the government’s plan 
to limit public spending have yet to go into 
effect, as the government fears a backlash. 
Growing Popular Dissatisfaction 
According to polls conducted in the spring 
and early summer, populations in Tunisia 
and Morocco initially showed satisfaction 
with and trust in their government’s re-
sponses. Algeria, in the aftermath of the 
Hirak protest movement, which resulted in 
the removal of former president Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika and demanded a complete political 
overhaul, continued to experience a lack of 
trust and scepticism about official statistics. 
As confinements were eased in June and 
July, cases began to rise shortly thereafter 
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in Morocco and Tunisia. However, as gov-
ernments failed to maintain the same level 
of coherence, competence, and control they 
had exhibited in the initial stages, public 
opinion quickly changed. Extensive eco-
nomic ties with and dependence on the 
outside world, including a need to generate 
tourism revenue, propelled Tunisia and 
Morocco to open their airports and ports in 
the summer. Both countries partly relaxed 
domestic travel restrictions, which allowed 
some commercial and social activities to 
resume by late June. Algeria, where inter-
national tourism plays a marginal econom-
ic role, remained completely isolated, halt-
ing all commercial air and sea traffic. Still, 
by the fall, infections rose again, even in 
Algeria, despite strict closures. In all three 
countries, as the pandemic continued and 
the economic toll intensified, perceptions 
of the governments’ responses degenerated 
across the board. 
In Morocco, both private and public 
health care systems started buckling in the 
summer and the population struggled. Hos-
pitals were quickly overwhelmed, despite 
efforts to boost them. Health care workers 
repeatedly protested poor working con-
ditions. The economic hardships caused by 
the confinement also worsened the level 
of public dissatisfaction. By the end of the 
summer, of the staggering $3.6 billion 
raised in support funds, $2.6 billion had 
already been spent. Yet, the government’s 
tight control of the streets prevented major 
protests, and most dissatisfaction was 
voiced online. 
In Algeria, Hirak protests – though on a 
much smaller level – have resumed spo-
radically, despite official bans on all public 
gatherings. Furthermore, widespread dis-
satisfaction with Algeria’s political system 
manifested in a record low turnout for the 
underwhelming November 1st referendum 
on constitutional amendments, indicating 
the extent to which Algerians reject these 
changes that the leadership touted as the 
foundation of a new Algeria. 
In Tunisia, by July, the government had 
collapsed due to corruption allegations 
involving Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh. 
Ongoing political divisions delayed the for-
mation of a government until September 
and have impacted the new technocratic 
government’s ability to manage the continu-
ing health crisis and eroded public trust. The 
widespread economic and political dissatis-
faction with the status quo has driven sup-
port for populist political forces – includ-
ing those associated with the former 
regime, such as the Free Destourian Party, 
led by Abir Moussi. Support for these fac-
tions has deepened political divisions and 
worsened the lack of consensus on finding 
a way out of the pandemic and developing 
a broader vision for the country’s future. 
By the fall, as Tunisia was about to mark 
the 10-year anniversary of its revolution, 
protests rose sharply. The widespread eco-
nomic hardship – compounded by the 
pandemic –further fuelled the anger of 
Tunisians. More protests broke out across 
the country and clashes with security forces 
increased, resulting in the first casualty in 
Sbeitla in October 2020. The population’s 
growing desperation is also seen in the in-
creasing numbers of irregular migrants 
moving to Spain and Italy from Algeria and 
Tunisia, despite stronger pushback against 
illegal crossings. 
Across the three countries, in part as a 
response to growing public dissatisfaction 
and under the guise of pandemic-related 
measures, the governments have increased 
efforts to curb freedom of expression and 
silence dissent. In Morocco and Algeria, 
journalists face more intimidation and 
smear campaigns, and many have been 
thrown into prison on trumped up charges 
in recent months. The Algerian govern-
ment, wary of a wide-scale resumption of 
the Hirak movement, adopted an amended 
penal code in April 2020 curbing freedom 
of expression by allowing the government 
to punish what it considers to be fake news. 
Morocco, likewise, attempted to pass a law 
restricting social media freedoms, but it had 
to pull back due to the massive backlash 
online. In Tunisia, bloggers who criticised 
the government’s pandemic response in 
spring 2020 faced judicial proceedings. More-
over, with a diminished system of checks 
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and balances, the governments’ efforts 
towards increasing levels of digitalisation 
open the door to greater state control and 
surveillance. For example, in Morocco, 
mobile applications meant for tracking 
movements were used to spy on opposition 
figures. As this environment of authoritar-
ianism and brutal crackdowns continues, 
it enflames the growing public anger. 
All three countries have made significant 
efforts to procure and build effective vac-
cination campaigns, with mixed results. 
Morocco began its campaign first with 
AstraZeneca and Sinopharm vaccines that 
have reached a significant number of 
people. However, there remain challenges 
of access for many, given the limited avail-
ability. Algeria has procured SputnikV 
doses, while Tunisia is still waiting for its 
campaign with the BioNTech-Pfizer product 
to begin. In all three cases, fears related to 
global disinformation campaigns about the 
vaccines are present. Whether potentially 
successful vaccination campaigns in 2021, 
notably in Morocco, can boost trust in gov-
ernments once again remains doubtful. 
Governance Deficit: Limited Out-
put and Diminishing Legitimacy 
By putting long-standing grievances centre 
stage, the pandemic has exposed the under-
lying weaknesses of all three governance 
approaches. Chief among these is the in-
ability of the states to meet their citizens’ 
needs. Ill-thought-out public policies and 
lagging and inadequate public services 
compound issues such as limited economic 
growth, opaque decision-making processes, 
and lack of accountability. 
These governance deficits present them-
selves differently in each country. Yet, the 
outcomes are remarkably similar in all 
three. In Algeria, a military-led civil leader-
ship has created a rentier system over the 
years that has distributed the country’s oil 
and gas revenues to key groups to offset 
dissatisfaction. In the aftermath of the civil 
war in the 1990s, the Algerian leadership – 
claiming legitimacy from their role in the 
country’s independence struggle and the 
founding of modern Algeria – used the 
presence of security threats to justify stark 
limits on political participation. However, 
the population grew increasingly disillu-
sioned with the lack of accountability and 
a closed political system. This became par-
ticularly acute in the lead-up to the Hirak 
protest movement, which began in 2019 
and has called for a complete overhaul of 
the political system. Years of incoherent 
policies, a lack of economic diversification, 
and rampant corruption have weakened 
critical service infrastructure, including 
health care, and severely diminished the 
state’s ability to prepare for and manage 
the viral outbreak. The fact that Algeria’s 
President Tebboune, who fell ill with Covid-
19 in October 2020, was flown to Germany 
for adequate treatment perfectly exempli-
fies these failures and follows a long tradi-
tion of the country’s elites seeking treat-
ment abroad. 
In Morocco, the pandemic is challenging 
the benevolent authoritarianism narrative 
and model that the monarchy has sought to 
emulate. Morocco created a highly central-
ised system, in which the King holds all 
political and economic power – a system 
that is able to deliver some services while 
also cracking down on dissent. Still, Morocco 
has failed to manifest efficient public poli-
cies and service delivery, and many Moroc-
cans have struggled to access basic needs. 
Widespread corruption and staggering 
inequalities throughout the country have 
highlighted the vulnerabilities of the lower 
class, and increasingly the middle class. 
Even prior to the pandemic, Morocco strug-
gled to provide education, health care, and 
basic infrastructure – including potable 
water – to many segments of the popula-
tion. The pandemic’s economic and finan-
cial toll further challenges the vision of an 
efficient, albeit authoritarian, state. The 
leadership has failed to deliver effective gov-
ernance that could offset authoritarianism. 
Tunisia’s fragile, young democracy faces 
ideological rifts and a fragmented political 
landscape that is intensifying the continued 
economic crisis. The result is deepening 
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social disparities and ensuing contestation, 
creating a vicious cycle: Demonstrations, 
strikes, and sit-ins are gaining in force, lim-
iting the government’s room for manoeuvre 
more broadly, and specifically hampering 
production in certain sectors. This com-
pounds the downward economic spiral. For 
instance, Tunisia, a phosphate exporter, ex-
perienced a significant drop in production 
in 2020, forcing it to import the material to 
cover domestic needs. The pandemic has 
underlined one of the country’s fundamen-
tal challenges: the inability to agree on an 
economic course that can reduce disparities 
while taking into account the country’s 
financial constraints. 
Although the weaknesses and failures of 
each of these governance approaches have 
been clear for years, the pandemic has put 
forth a unique test to their sustainability by 
adding greater urgency and compounding 
the needs of the population. Without a 
clear way forward, these political systems 
risk significant instability. 
An Economic Paradox: The Change 
Needed Is the Change Feared 
The economies of Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia are confronting grim GDP growth 
and debt predictions (see Figure 1) from 
domestic and international financial insti-
tutions (IFIs). Although specific estimates 
vary, the significant economic contraction 
in 2020 will likely yield low-growth rates 
for 2021. As the pandemic brought social 
life to a halt, consumption slowed, and in 
some cases production slowed, dealing a 
blow to state revenue. In Morocco and 
Tunisia, losses from diminishing tourism 
revenue have been notable. Tunisia, where 
tourism revenue represents 14% of GDP, 
reported a 77% drop in the number of tour-
ists in 2020 compared to 2019. In Algeria, 
where energy revenue accounts for 60% of 
the state budget and 94% of total export 
revenue – hydrocarbon revenue shrunk by 
31% in 2020 compared to 2019. All three 
countries have also struggled with addi-
tional spending to offset some of the initial 
economic burdens, to support the health 
care sector, and to acquire vaccines. In the 
face of rising expenditures and diminishing 
revenues, Morocco and Tunisia have, in addi-
tion to aid from international partners, taken 
on additional debt, driving up their debt 
rates as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 1). 
One of the inherent challenges facing 
these governments is that the pandemic’s 
economic fallout risks slowing or prevent-
ing the necessary macro-economic reforms 
and investments in critical infrastructure. 
In Morocco, for instance, the government’s 
recovery plan foresees merging or consoli-
dating state-owned enterprises, yet costlier 
but crucial sectors – such as education, 
security, and health care – are excluded 
from these plans. Thus, critical infrastruc-
ture and services for citizens are more 
likely to deteriorate in the short term. 
In Tunisia, the crisis has sharpened dis-
agreements about the country’s economic 
future. The government needs funding 
from external actors, including the IFIs, 
which understand Tunisia’s conundrum 
and have toned down demands for struc-
tural reforms. Yet, even control of wage 
bills or certain energy subsidies deemed 
necessary by the IMF appear to be political-
ly highly sensitive, if not unfeasible, with 
unemployment rates and social unrest soar-
ing. Furthermore, Tunisia’s central bank 
reported in January 2021 that debt as a per-
centage of GDP has exceeded 100%, seriously 
limiting the country’s ability to obtain 
credit. Rare positive economic news, such 
as growing liquidity reserves, as in the 
autumn of 2020, does not signal a general 
upswing but is merely related to decreased 
consumption due to Covid-19. 
In Algeria, the pandemic’s economic 
fallout is speeding up the looming liquidity 
crisis, which will not only prevent the gov-
ernment from buying social peace, as it 
had in the past, but will also halt efforts to 
diversify the hydrocarbon-reliant economy. 
So far, President Tebboune’s government 
has repeatedly ruled out borrowing from 
the IMF or the World Bank. 
The measures that the governments of 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have under-
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taken so far do not represent effective long-
term solutions, which limits their chances 
of overcoming a profound economic crisis. 
The situation thus promises to be tenuous 
at best, and it is likely to increase inequality 
and drive popular anger and protest move-
ments. 
Capacity for Adaptation? 
As the three countries deal with the pan-
demic’s pressures and their impacts on long-
standing issues, the governments must find 
the right path forward. Whether this global 
pandemic can provide the needed impetus 
for change remains an open question. 
Algerian decision-makers face a particu-
larly urgent question: Should they abandon 
the heavily centralised economic approach 
in favour of a more liberal and open eco-
nomic policy? So far, the elites have vacil-
lated between the two. In 2019 a new, more 
liberal hydrocarbon law was passed that is 
aimed at stimulating foreign investment, 
while at the same time protectionist 
measures, such as import restrictions, are 
applied haphazardly for short-term relief; 
meanwhile tax and fiscal policies are over-
due for reform. The lack of trust and the 
absence of transparency and accountability 
remain key challenges. Even if current 
power brokers – business interests and 
the military – with competing clientelist 
agendas were to agree on profound reforms 
in the interest of their own survival, it is 
unclear whether the population would give 
them the benefit of the doubt. Yet, in many 
ways, the authoritarian model remains 
resistant and is still managing to co-opt, 
divide, and buy off dissenters, even if with 
less success than in the past. A profound 
and decisive reform plan is necessary for 
Algeria to move forward, as piecemeal 
reforms are unlikely to address the current 
challenges and ensure stability. 
Morocco and Tunisia, likewise, will also 
have to push forth comprehensive reforms 
to rise to the challenge, even if Morocco in 
the past has proven to weather shocks quite 
Figure 1 and 2 
 
 
Source: World Bank, Algeria’s, Morocco’s and Tunisia’s Economic Updates, October 2020. 
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well. Here the most significant challenge 
to passing sweeping economic and political 
reform is entrenched interests, particularly 
that of the monarchy. Although Morocco has 
favoured an open economic approach – 
generating significant foreign investment 
over the years and diversifying away from 
agriculture to build manufacturing and pro-
duction infrastructure – the progress has 
ultimately been successful mainly to the ex-
tent that it has not threatened the monar-
chy’s own business interests and the inter-
ests of those closest to it. For example, the 
monarchy remains in control of key sectors, 
thereby keeping foreign and even domestic 
investors out. In Tunisia, the lack of con-
sensus on a path forward for economic 
development and the failure to develop a 
robust governance approach have enflamed 
popular anger. Exactly 10 years after the 
revolution, Tunisians’ hopes for economic 
prosperity are dwindling, social peace is elu-
sive, and public trust in democracy is low. 
Yet, the pandemic crisis has created 
some opportunities for innovation and 
social entrepreneurship, and even a degree 
of self-reliance. The three governments en-
couraged private-sector actors to produce 
ventilators domestically for their respective 
health sectors. Moroccans even produced a 
locally made diagnostic kit for SARS-CoV-2. 
The increased citizen engagement has also 
been a ray of hope. Civil society groups in 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have played 
an important role in raising community 
awareness, distributing masks, and deliv-
ering aid to the most vulnerable. Due to 
their own limited capacities, governments 
at times have had no choice but to rely on 
such citizen engagement. In Algeria, offi-
cials prided themselves in licensing 4,000 
civil society organisations within a month 
and half. Certainly, this bears the risk of an 
inflation of GoNGOs (government-supported 
non-governmental organisations), thereby 
shielding the government from criticism or 
competition. Yet, a number of local initia-
tives are building on previous efforts to 
reform the system, not through contesta-
tion but through citizen engagement, in-
cluding private-sector actors. Hence, these 
pandemic-related openings may present an 
opportunity to rebuild citizen engagement, 
strengthen the role of the private sector, 
and foster strong, decisive, and innovative 
governance approaches. 
However, greater and more systemic 
changes are necessary. Without those, the 
pandemic may prove to be a catalyst for in-
stability and social unrest as the gulf widens 
between the few prosperous segments of 
society and the greater number of vulner-
able communities. Although the leaders of 
these countries understand the gravity of 
the situation, they have yet to undertake 
promising reforms. Whether these govern-
ments are able to adapt will depend on a 
few key determinants. For one, the extent 
to which these countries are able to restore 
some degree of trust in their institutions 
will require crafting longer-term recovery 
measures that produce more tangible out-
puts for the citizens. A further indicator of 
the capacity to adapt is the degree to which 
these countries – particularly Morocco and 
Algeria – ease the crackdown on freedom 
of expression. Finally, more thoughtfulness 
and consensus around a realistic economic 
and social vision for all three countries 
requires compromise – and even personal 
sacrifice by the governing elites. Whether 
they are prepared to do this is unclear. 
Maghreb-EU Cooperation: 
A Chance to Rethink Old Practices 
The EU and its members states – the Magh-
reb region’s most important partners – can 
play a crucial role in supporting governance 
reform in the Maghreb, even during this dif-
ficult period. European policy-makers have 
an opportunity in this moment of change 
to rethink their own practices and percep-
tions. The political elites in countries of the 
Maghreb have managed to muddle through, 
in part because of international support. 
This support has at times been uncondi-
tional – with significant financial, politi-
cal, and diplomatic backing – to maintain 
regional stability. The pandemic’s impacts 
may provide a greater impetus to support 
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these governments unconditionally – espe-
cially in terms of emergency funding and 
relief, and to address shorter-term threats 
of insecurity and instability. However, 
this has to be done without overshadowing 
the long-term challenges of building sus-
tainable economies and equitable societies. 
Economic and fiscal challenges in Mo-
rocco, Algeria, and Tunisia will increase 
their reliance on the EU for economic and 
financial support. This presents an oppor-
tunity to encourage better governance prac-
tices. In this situation, European partners 
may be tempted to direct aid primarily 
through governments. This should not 
come at the expense of support to elected 
institutions and civil society. In short, the 
broader the ownership and buy-in, the 
more chances for success. A key effort in 
supporting these countries is to ensure that 
funding, international messaging, and con-
ditions accompanying cooperation reflect 
citizens’ priorities. A systematic and rigor-
ous focus on governance and service deliv-
ery in Euro-Maghrebi cooperation will lay 
the foundation for relations and credibility 
with those that matter most: the popula-
tions in the Maghreb. 
In doing so, it is worthwhile to acknowl-
edge the differences between the countries 
and to adjust measures to the specific con-
texts accordingly. This implies rewarding 
each country’s progress in key areas: eco-
nomic and human development, civil and 
political liberties, and security. In terms of 
the increase in crackdowns on freedom of 
expression in Morocco and Algeria, Euro-
pean partners should remember that the 
countries’ chances of overcoming the enor-
mous social inequalities are stronger with 
more freedom of speech and expression, 
not with less. In Morocco, the taboo of dis-
cussing the monarchy’s involvement in 
the economy prevents discussions on an 
equitable and effective governance ap-
proach. In Algeria, more outspokenness 
regarding the intensifying crackdown is 
necessary. 
Tunisia needs ongoing funding and ben-
efits to support reforms towards more effec-
tive governance, and to protect the demo-
cratic progress. This will signal that democ-
ratisation, even in trying times, still matters 
to European policy-makers. In doing so, 
European partners are well advised to sys-
tematically incentivise domestic coopera-
tion and consensus-building in Tunisia. This 
can be achieved by rewarding cooperation 
across party and institutional boundaries. 
Germany’s reform partnerships, which allo-
cate funds once common benchmarks are 
met and require coordination across several 
ministries, are a step in this direction. 
Algeria is in need of profound govern-
ance reform, as the very foundation of its 
rentier economy is eroding. At the same 
time, Algeria is the partner with the most 
strained European relations – due to 
France’s bloody colonial past and Algeria’s 
sovereign pride. Given these sensitivities, 
the country has signaled that it would 
benefit from technical cooperation to lay 
the foundation for a new economic policy. 
European actors should encourage such 
cooperation to be inclusive and support 
engagement by civil society actors such as 
economic think tanks and independent 
private businesses. 
Finally, international debt relief discus-
sions for Africa have so far not included 
the (lower-) middle-income countries of 
the Maghreb. An option here is to focus on 
grants rather than credits or loans in the 
case of Morocco, and even more so Tunisia. 
This is how European partners can generate 
goodwill with the governments and the 
populations while encouraging governance 
approaches in a sounder and more sustain-
able direction. 
Intissar Fakir is a fellow and Editor in Chief of Sada in Carnegie’s Middle East Program. 
Dr Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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